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Abstract 
Virtualization has become more important since cloud computing        
is getting more and more popular than before. There’s an          
increasing demand for security among the cloud customers.        
AMD plans to provide Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)​[8]        
technology in its latest processor EPYC to protect virtual         
machines by encrypting its memory but without integrity        
protection. In this paper, we analyzed the weakness in the SEV           
design due to lack of integrity protection thus it is not so secure.             
Using different design flaw in physical address-based tweak        
algorithm to protect against ciphertext block move attacks, we         
found a realistic attack against SEV which could obtain the root           
privilege of an encrypted virtual machine protected by SEV. A          
demo to simulate the attack against a virtual machine protected          
by SEV is done in a Ryzen machine which supports Secure           
Memory Encryption (SME)​[8] technology since SEV enabled       
machine is still not available in market. 
Keywords: ​Hypervisor, SEV, Nested Page Table, Guest Page        
Table, Host OS, Guest OS, physical address. 
1. Introduction 
Virtualization​[1] technology plays a more and more       
important role with the prevalent of cloud computing.        
Cloud provider provides hardware resources which allow       
multiple customers to share the hardware resources by        
launching different virtual machines (VM) in the shared        
platforms. Customers need neither to buy the hardware        
resources nor to maintain the systems by themselves which         
could greatly reduce their costs. VMs are isolated by a          
privileged software called hypervisor to provide secure       
environment for each customer. Intel and AMD have        
provided VT-X​[11] and AMD-V (SVM)​[12] technology      
respectively in their x86 CPU architecture to boost up         
virtualization performance with hardware support. 
Hypervisor is responsible for managing multiple resources       
for VMs. For example, hypervisor allocates physical       
memories, creates virtual network device and sets up        
virtual IO port for a guest VM. It allows corresponding          
hardware resources efficiently shared and fully utilized.       
But there is still a secure gap in the virtualization          
technologies. Hypervisor could access all resources of       
VMs which grants cloud provider the ability to access         
private information of customers in the VMs. Some        
customers may be reluctant to use those virtualization        
technologies due to security concern. 
 
 
Picture 1. Virtualization 
If there were bugs in the code of hypervisor, such as those            
have been found in reality​[3~6]​, customers using the        
corresponding VMs are in the danger of losing their         
information.  
To solve the problem, AMD provides SEV technology to         
enhance the SVM. Unlike Intel’s Software Guard       
Extensions (SGX)​[9] or Trust-zone​[10] in ARM architecture       
which try to isolate trusted resources from untrusted        
access by special hardware logic, SEV encrypts memory        
of VMs by taking advantage of SME technology and         
encrypting different VMs with different keys to prevent        
unauthorized access. But SEV provides no integrity       
protection so that a malicious or compromised hypervisor        
is able to modify the cipher-text of VMs. This opens a           
door for potential attack. F. Hetzelt et al.​[7] provided three          
proof-of-concept attacks against the SEV. Two of them        
used the unencrypted guest context and virtual machine        
control block (VMCB) and they were not available any         
more after the SEV Encrypted State (ES) feature was         
provided by AMD to solve the problem according to         
AMD latest Memory Encryption Whitepaper​[14]​. In the last        
proof-of-concept attack, a malicious hypervisor could      
 
launch a replay attack against a VM protected by SEV.          
But they agreed that SEV was still not broken in their           
paper. 
AMD has used an additional physical address-based       
tweak algorithm to protect against cipher-text block move        
attacks. In this paper, we found out the tweak algorithm          
after analyzing it in a Ryzen machine which supports         
SME. The tweak algorithm is a linear function in the finite           
field if both input text and physical address are treated           
as vectors in . Using the fact that there’s no integrity           
protection of encrypted memory, we can design a real         
attack against SEV. A simulation of SEV environment        
was built in a Ryzen machine (which supports SME)since         
SEV is still not available in market. Attacker in         
hypervisor can obtain the root privilege of guest VM in          
tens of seconds. 
2. Background 
2.1 Secure Encrypted Virtualization 
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)​[13] was introduced      
by AMD to meet the security gap between existing         
virtualization technology and customer security     
requirements. SEV utilizes the Secure Memory Encryption       
(SME)​[14] technology to encrypt memory contents of a        
guest VM. SME is a real time memory encryption         
technology. It makes the contents of the memory more         
resistant to memory snooping and cold boot attacks. The         
encryption key is manipulated by a “Security” Processor        
and is invisible to OS and application. SEV feature allows          
the memory contents of virtual machine(VM) to be        
transparently encrypted with key unique to each VM. The         
hypervisor could only read the cipher-text of the contents         
of VM. Similar to SME, all encryption keys are managed          
by “Security” Processor so that they’re invisible to        
hypervisor. 
 
  
Picture 2 SME vs. SEV 
The solution sounds perfect since all contents of VM have          
been encrypted by the well-known algorithm – AES​[15]        
which provides confidentiality of VM. It looks like that         
although hypervisor can read and write to the cipher-text         
of VM, without the secret key, usually it doesn’t know          
what the corresponding plaintext is and writing to the         
memory of VM is likely to make the VM crash and           
hypervisor can’t get any secure information of the VM.         
But data integrity is also critical and D. Boneh​[16] has          
emphasized the importance of integrity protection in his        
cryptography lecture. 
 
Picture 3 Hypervisor and guest VM 
2.2 Paging in OS 
In a computer system, each piece of memory has a unique           
address which is the physical address of the memory. To          
enable multiple applications to run in the same computer         
system simultaneously and share the limited memory       
resource, a memory management scheme is provided in        
most modern computer systems. The OS partitions the        
system memory into some blocks (usually with same size)         
called memory pages.  
 
Picture 4 Virtual Address and Physical Address 
OS could dynamically assign those memory pages to        
different applications and new application-specified     
 
addresses are assigned to those pages. The       
application-specified address is the virtual address of the        
memory page in the application. Page Tables are used to          
map the virtual address of each application to physical         
address or alternatively a location in external storage. A         
page table entry (PTE) is associated with each page and it           
also provides some extra attributes of the memory page. 
 
2.3 Nested Page Table 
To support virtualization, the hypervisor needs to assign        
physical memory pages dynamically to each VM. New        
addresses should be assigned to those pages inside the VM          
and VM will reassign those pages to applications running         
in the VM. The new address that hypervisor assigned to          
VM is the virtual machine physical address. OS in VM          
knows nothing about host physical address. 
 
Picture 5 Nested Page Table in SVM 
According to AMD64 Architecture Programmer     
Manual​[18]​, Nested Page Table is provided. OS in virtual         
machine should maintain a guest page table (gPT) which         
maps virtual address to virtual machine physical address        
while hypervisor maintains a nested page table (nPT)        
which maps virtual machine physical address to host        
physical address.  
2.4 The C-bit 
SEV encrypts memory of different VMs by different keys         
and also hypervisor has its own key to encrypt its memory.           
But sometimes, VMs may need some non-encrypted       
memory. For instance, a VM may use shared memory to          
share data with hypervisor or a hardware. For both SME          
and SEV, A C-bit in page table entry of each page is used             
to indicate whether the page has been encrypted. When         
SEV is enabled, VM could use the C-bit in gPT to           
determine whether a page should be encrypted by the key          
unique to the VM. Page Table and codes are always          
treated as encrypted data even though the corresponding        
C-bit is not set.  
 
Picture 6 C-bit in PTE 
In both SME and SEV, if two virtual addresses are mapped           
to same physical address but the C-bit is set for one virtual            
address and not set for another one, load access from first           
virtual address always gets the plaintext transparently and        
the load access from second virtual address always gets the          
cipher-text given the cache has been reflushed between the         
two loads. Similarly, store access to the first virtual         
address are treated as plaintext and encrypted transparently        
and store access to the second virtual address is not          
encrypted and the data is treated as cipher-text if it is           
loaded via the first virtual address later. 
2.5 AES algorithm 
SEV and SME use AES​[15] as the memory encryption         
algorithm according to AMD’s ​Memory Encryption      
Whitepaper​. Encryption is a process to encode some user         
input -- the plaintext into cipher-text so that only         
authorized parties could decode the cipher-text into       
plaintext again. In symmetric-key encryption algorithm      
such as AES, all authorized parties share a secret key and           
both encryption and decryption could be processed only        
when the secret key is available. AES is a block cipher           
algorithm where 128-bits block is used with three different         
key lengths: 128, 196 and 256 bits. 
There are multiple modes of operation available for block         
cipher. Modes like CBC, CFB, OFB chain different blocks         
together so that they are not suitable for memory         
encryption. Usually memory is accessed randomly and the        
performance penalty will be too heavy if those modes are          
used because multiple blocks of data will be involved to          
decode the data of a single block. CTR mode could          
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provide better performance but the mode is not secure         
because each counter should be used only once unless the          
key has been changed in the viewpoint of security. Since          
no extra memory is used to save the counter, counter for           
each memory address must be reused and it violates the          
security requirement of CTR mode. So ECB mode is the          
only choice if taking into account both performance and         
security. There’s a well-known secure issue that ECB        
mode generates same ciphertext output with same plaintext        
input. . Figure 7 depicts the problem that in the encrypted           
picture, we could still find the outline of human being          
head. 
 
Figure 7. AES ECB mode secure issue 
To overcome the problem, AMD uses a physical        
address-based tweak algorithm to combine physical      
address together with input plaintext. The output of the         
tweak algorithm is encrypted by AES algorithm again to         
generate the cipher-text. By applying the tweak algorithm,        
equal plaintexts in different physical addresses are       
encrypted into different cipher-texts. 
3. Weakness of SEV 
One of the problem in the SEV design is that the data            
integrity protection is not provided while it is critical to          
security design according to D. Boneh​[16]​. Missing of        
integrity protection means malicious hypervisor could      
modify the cipher-texts of a guest VM. A malicious         
hypervisor could also overwrite the data of any memory         
location with older version data from same location        
(replay attack). F. Hetzelt et al.​[7] has introduced a         
proof-of-concept attack to launch a replay attack on VM. 
Another problem is that after a VM is started, the VM           
Encryption Key (VEK) will never change. The life range         
of the encryption key will never end as long as the VM            
keeps alive. According to birthday paradox​[19]​, when a key         
(the key length is 128-bits) is used for around times,         264  
the probability of existing equal cipher-texts becomes       
obvious. Equal cipher-texts indicates that there’s a simple        
relationship between the corresponding plaintexts. If one       
of the plaintexts is known in advance, attacker could         
calculate another plaintext easily. To keep the probability        
of equal ciphertexts ignorable, it is suggested that an         
encryption key should be used for no more than  times.248  
The third problem is that the nPT of nested page table is            
maintained by hypervisor and the hypervisor could modify        
the page table without permission from guest VM. 
The last problem is that the physical address-based tweak         
algorithm uses the host physical address instead of virtual         
machine physical address. If a malicious attacker swaps        
the virtual machine physical address of two encrypted        
pages of the VM, VM is still able to decrypt both pages            
successfully but the data in the two pages has been          
exchanged without the permission from VM. 
Attacks can be designed conceptually based on above        
problems. However it is not easy to create a realistic attack           
on the SEV until we reveal the physical address-based         
tweak algorithm used by SME and SEV. A linear function          
in Finite Field is used for the tweak algorithm. Given           
any two equal cipher-texts in two different physical        
addresses, we could conduct the relationship of the two         
corresponding plaintexts. And given any two physical       
addresses, we could calculate the required relationship of        
plaintext to generate equal cipher-texts in the two        
addresses. This opens a door for the Chosen Plaintext         
Attack. 
4. Physical Address-based Tweak 
To analyze the physical address-based tweak algorithm,       
we used a Ryzen machine with SME support. The AMD          
SME patch​[20] was applied and SME feature was enabled.         
The SME kernel patch provided a function to switch the          
C-bit of a memory page. The function flushes cache before          
changing the C-bit and flushes TLB again after changing         
the C-bit. A new kernel module was created to provide the           
interface to change the C-bit for user level code. 
When we write data into a memory page with C-bit unset           
and read data back from the memory page with C-bit set,           
the written data will be treated as cipher-texts and be          
decrypted automatically when it’s read with C-bit set. On         
the other hand, if we write data into the memory page with            
C-bit set and read data back from the memory page with           
C-bit unset, the written data will be treated as plaintext and           
be encrypted automatically when it is flushed from cache         
to memory. After we read it again with C-bit unset, we           
could get the corresponding cipher-texts. 
In our first experiment, we wrote plaintexts of arithmetic         
sequence into same physical address and read the        
corresponding cipher-texts sequence. A NIST randomness      
test suite​[21] was used to verify that the output cipher-texts          
sequence had perfect randomness so that the mode of         
operation is not CTR but ECB.. 
Next we wrote equal plaintexts into different physical        
addresses in the memory page and found that the output          
cipher-texts also looked like a perfect random sequence. 
 
variable value  in hexadecimal 
t4  82 25 38 38 82 25 38 38 82 25 38 38 82 25 38 38  
t5  ec 09 07 9c ec 09 07 9c ec 09 07 9c ec 09 07 9c  
t6  40 00 00 18 40 00 00 18 40 00 00 18 40 00 00 18  
t7  81 02 a2 3a 81 02 a2 3a 81 02 a2 3a 81 02 a2 3a  
t8  77 d9 10 77 77 d9 10 77 77 d9 10 77 77 d9 10 77 
t9  b0 10 b2 c0 b0 10 b2 c0 b0 10 b2 c0 b0 10 b2 c0 
t10  53 6d 54 4d 53 6d 54 4d 53 6d 54 4d 53 6d 54 4d 
t11  15 68 ee 53 15 68 ee 53 15 68 ee 53 15 68 ee 53 
t12  b0 92 30 c2 b0 92 30 c2 b0 92 30 c2 b0 92 30 c2 
 t13  96 70 ff 8e 96 70 ff 8e 96 70 ff 8e 96 70 ff 8e 
t14  36 1b 90 d5 36 1b 90 d5 36 1b 90 d5 36 1b 90 d5 
t15  04 00 c2 36 04 00 c2 36 04 00 c2 36 04 00 c2 36 
t16  e8 18 29 85 e8 18 29 85 e8 18 29 85 e8 18 29 85 
t17  bd 31 f9 2a bd 31 f9 2a bd 31 f9 2a bd 31 f9 2a 
t18  a5 0d 37 44 a5 0d 37 44 a5 0d 37 44 a5 0d 37 44 
t19  f4 31 d8 4c f4 31 d8 4c f4 31 d8 4c f4 31 d8 4c 
t20  02 04 31 81 02 04 31 81 02 04 31 81 02 04 31 81 
t21  b3 71 32 a1 b3 71 32 a1 b3 71 32 a1 b3 71 32 a1 
t22  50 8a c0 6c 50 8a c0 6c 50 8a c0 6c 50 8a c0 6c 
t23  16 8a 80 20 16 8a 80 20 16 8a 80 20 16 8a 80 20 
t24  7f 9b c0 07 7f 9b c0 07 7f 9b c0 07 7f 9b c0 07 
t25  00 db 04 07 00 db 04 07 00 db 04 07 00 db 04 07 
t26  7f 00 04 04 7f 00 04 04 7f 00 04 04 7f 00 04 04 
t27  70 fa 01 be 70 fa 01 be 70 fa 01 be 70 fa 01 be 
t28  bb 3d 28 90 bb 3d 28 90 bb 3d 28 90 bb 3d 28 90 
t29  bd 2d d5 26 bd 2d d5 26 bd 2d d5 26 bd 2d d5 26 
t30  1c 5d 6c e2 1c 5d 6c e2 1c 5d 6c e2 1c 5d 6c e2 
t31  af 4c 8f a4 af 4c 8f a4 af 4c 8f a4 af 4c 8f a4 
t32  4f 5c e7 27 4f 5c e7 27 4f 5c e7 27 4f 5c e7 27 
t33  af 4c 8f a4 af 4c 8f a4 af 4c 8f a4 af 4c 8f a4 
Table 1. Tweak function parameters 
Finally we tried to write equal cipher-texts into different         
physical addresses in the memory page and found the         
output plaintexts could not pass the randomness test.        
Manual analysis on the first several lines of output         
plaintexts showed that the data should be in linear         
relationship in finite field and the linear relationship         
could be verified by a C code. 
 
Figure 8. Equal ciphertexts in different addresses 
We then randomly allocated many memory pages with        
C-bit unset and wrote equal cipher-texts into all of those          
memory pages. Setting C-bits of all those memory pages         
and reading back all those plaintexts, we got a list of           
plaintexts together with corresponding physical addresses      
with equal cipher-texts. Using Gaussian Elimination in the        
field , we found out that the physical address-based         
tweak function is a linear function with parameter as Table          
1. 
We could define a function , where is     (x) ⊕ t   T =  x =1i i    
the th-bit of integer , is the sum of vectors in finite     ⊕         
field (or bitwise exclusive-or) and is a        
128-dimensions constant vector in as in the table 1. For           
plaintext in address and plaintext in address        
, the ciphertext is equal if and only if         
or   
since is linear function, where is the bitwise         
exclusive-or operation. 
5. Simulate Attack of SEV 
Since there is no integrity protection provided by SEV and          
malicious hypervisor is able to modify the cipher-texts of         
VM, with tweak function provided in section 4,         
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malicious code in hypervisor is able to inject any code into           
any address of a VM. In this section, we show how the            
attack could be done efficiently.  
Since SEV enabled machine is still not available in         
market, the attack is simulated in a Ryzen machine which          
supports SME. We believe the attack does also work in          
SEV enabled machine since the same encryption algorithm        
is used by both SME and SEV according to AMD’s          
Memory Encryption Whitepaper​.  
It is assumed that hypervisor has been compromised so         
that the attack is started from privileged code of         
hypervisor.  
5.1 Prerequisite 
Both host and guest VM use Ubuntu 16.04 in our demo.           
We assume that the OS image of both host and guest VM            
is public available.  
We also assumed that the guest VM needs to communicate          
with hypervisor or other external parts so that an external          
part could send some data into the VM and part of the data             
will be kept in the memory of VM, and encrypted          
automatically by guest VM VEK. For example, guest VM         
may receive data from external part by network or guest          
VM may read data in a virtual hard disk provided by           
hypervisor. By assuming that the attacker has controlled        
the hypervisor and host OS, the attacker has the ability to           
apply the Chosen Plaintext Attack by sending chosen        
plaintext to the VM. 
A popular http server-- nginx is pre-installed in the guest          
VM to work as a data receiver in the VM so that            
hypervisor could deliver data to VM via nginx. 
We also need a victim code with root privilege in the VM.            
An ssh server-- sshd is pre-installed and enabled in the          
guest VM as the victim code. Similar attack could be          
applied to kernel codes or other code with root privilege          
too.  
5.2 Driver to simulate SEV environment 
The basic idea is that we start a VM with all contents to be              
encrypted (so C-bits in corresponding page table are all         
set). At the same time, all the memory pages of VM is            
remapped by a new page table in hypervisor with all C-bits           
unset and the code to simulate the attack should only read           
encrypted-data of VM via the new page table.  
QEMU​[22] and KVM​[23] are used in our demo to start a VM.            
SME is enabled in the demo machine so that when started,           
C-bits in all nPT entries are set so all memories used by            
the VM are encrypted automatically. To achieve the goal         
to simulate the encrypted VM and hypervisor could read         
cipher-texts only, we created a driver module in the host          
OS and we name it the assist driver. The assist driver           
provides: 
i) Scan nPT of the VM (which is visible to hypervisor) and            
find all physical memories assigned to the VM 
ii) Create new page table entries in the hypervisor to map           
all physical memories assigned to VM into virtual address         
of hypervisor and unset C-bits of all those pages. 
iii) The hypervisor is able to read and write cipher-texts of           
all memory pages owned by VM (cache coherence        
instructions are required). 
 
Figure 9. Remap address of VM with C-bit unset 
5.3 Prepare data receiver in VM 
A popular http server--nginx is pre-installed in the guest 
VM to play the role as data receiver inside the VM. First 
the http server is tested in a VM without memory 
encryption. We found that Mempool is used in nginx for 
memory management. When an external user sends some 
data to the server, part of the data is almost always left in a 
fixed memory page as long as the server is not restarted. 
 
Figure 10. Send data to VM 
 
We noticed although some of data sent to the server is           
overwritten after the server finish processing the data, at         
least bytes of injected data is left in the memory 2 ×166           
page. We called the memory region to receive the         2 ×166  
 
bytes of injected data as Bridge and it provided the          
opportunities for Chosen Plaintext Attack. We then called        
the memory page containing the Bridge as Bridge Page.         
We found that the offset of Bridge inside the Bridge Page           
never changes even if the server was restarted. 
 
We could use any http client to inject data into the Bridge,            
such as command 
$nc    192.168.1.2  80  < target_file.txt > 
injected data in file target_file.txt into the Bridge. We have          
also tried other http clients, such as browser with GUI, curl           
or tool using TCP/Socket, all of them could successfully         
inject data into Bridge. 
5.4 Prepare the Victim 
We selected sshd as the victim code because it’s a popular           
tool and runs in root privilege and it provides user          
connected to the service a shell interface so that it is           
convenient for demo.  
First we prepared a 48 bytes code (which is named as           
shellcode) to fork a child process running as root and          
provide a shell interface to attack. We also found the code           
in sshd to authenticate the user login information and the          
goal of the attack is to replace the authentication code by           
the 48 bytes shellcode. We called the data of the first 16            
bytes of the code to be replaced as the Characteristic Code. 
 
Figure 11. The 48 bytes Victim code 
 
Figure 12. Logic of victim and injected code 
5.5 Search for Bridge 
Since the address of Bridge changes every time the http          
server is restarted, we needed to find the physical address          
of a Bridge in a VM in hypervisor. 
The Bridge contains 62 groups of continuous 16 bytes         
data. Let’s assume the offset of the 62 groups of data in the             
Bridge Page to be .     
If we send data into the Bridge        
where function is defined in section 4, the        
cipher-texts of all the 62 groups should be exact same          
according to result of section 4 taking advantage of the          
factor that function is a linear function (If is         
enhanced to a nonlinear function, even if physical address         
is tweaked into both plaintext and cipher-text, we could         
still find out the bridge by algorithm similar to section 5.6           
although it requires longer time to search for the bridge).  
So we could find the address of Bridge by: 
i) Generate data  . 
ii) Send the above data by any http client to the          
Bridge which will be encrypted by hardware       
using guest VM VEK automatically. 
iii) Dump out cipher-texts in all physical memory       
pages of VM by assist driver. 
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iv) Analyze above ciphertext to find 62 groups       
continuous equal ciphertexts to identify physical      
address of Bridge -- the BPA. 
 
Figure 13. Logic to Search for Bridge 
5.6 Search for Characteristic Code of Victim 
We need also to determine the physical address of the          
Characteristic Code in the code of victim sshd. The below          
steps could be used to enumerate the physical address of          
Characteristic Code:  
1. We have found physical address of Bridge BPA in          
section 5.5 
2. We also have the 16 bytes Characteristic Code: and          
the offset inside page is known 
3. For every 16 bytes physical address        
whose offset inside page is same as that of CC 
3.1.  Calculate   
3.2.  Send 16 bytes  to Bridge by http client 
3.3.  Read and compare cipher-texts in  and 
 by assist driver. The Characteristic Code is 
in physical address  if the two cipher-texts 
match. 
4. End For 
 
Reading of cipher-texts by assist driver requires       
deactivating of guest VM and flushing cache and TLB and          
it takes a lot of time. Since there’re total 62 groups of            
16-bytes of data in the Bridge, we could improve the          
above algorithm searching for 62 physical address       
candidates of CC in each round. 
 
Figure 14. Logic to Search for Characteristic Code 
5.7 Inject Shellcode 
Now both BPA and physical address of CC (PCC) have          
been available. The next step is to change the code in PCC            
to Shellcode. What we need do is: 
i) Calculate 48 bytes data 
         
 
 
ii)   Send above data to Bridge by http client 
iii) Read the first 48 bytes of cipher-texts in Bridge by           
assist driver 
iv) overwritten cipher-texts of the first 48 bytes in PCC by           
the above cipher-texts  
After that, the shellcode has been injected into the victim          
sshd. 
Next, we could connect to the ssh server from hypervisor          
to obtain the root privilege of the guest VM. 
 
 Figure 15. Overwritten Characteristic Code by ShellCode 
6 Result 
The demo is done with an HP machine whose CPU model           
is AMD Ryzen 7 1700X with both SVM and SME          
enabled. Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS is installed as host OS and          
the system memory is 8GB DDR4 2400MHz. A VM is          
started from Qemu and the memory size of the VM is           
1GB. The OS Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS is also used by VM and            
OpenSSH_7.2p2 Ubuntu-4ubuntu2.2 and nginx/1.10.3 are     
installed in the VM. 
 
Figure 16. Search for Bridge 
The time to search for Bridge and inject shellcode to 
replace Characteristic Code could be ignored and most 
time is consumed in searching for Characteristic Code. It 
takes about 20 seconds on average to find the 
Characteristic Code. 
 
Figure 17. Search for Characteristic Code 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the current         
implementation of SEV is vulnerable. We suggest AMD to         
update the physical address-based tweak algorithm before       
releasing SEV into market. The physical address-based       
tweak algorithm should not tweak the address into        
plaintexts or cipher-texts. The address should be tweaked        
into key of AES algorithm to protect against cipher-text         
move attacks. It is preferred that Key Derivation Function         
such as the one specified in NIST SP 800-108​[24] should be           
used to tweak the address into the key. Encryption is not           
enough to isolate VMs from hypervisor and it is better that           
integrity protection could also be provided. The idea to         
provide a technology to isolate data of guest VM from          
hypervisor is promising, but there’re still a lot of         
improvement opportunities in the current implementation. 
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